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Benjamin Ziemann
Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and USAsince 1945:
An Introduction1
Thehistoriographyof peacemovementsafter theendof theSecondWorldWar isstill devel-
oping, both empiricallyandconceptually. Manycountriesin Western Europearestill a terra
incognita concerning the history of their peace movements during the Cold War, not only
with regardto the work that isavailable in English. Most of the comparative literature on re-
cent peace movements in different countries was inspired by the massive wave of protest
against thedeployment of Euromissilesin theearly1980s—thiswastheoccasionforavariety
of monographsandeditedvolumeswrittenbysociologistsandpolitical scientists.2 It isoneof
the characteristic features of this subject that there are still three very distinct and different
approaches, although this handicap could turn into an advantage in the very near future.
First, contemporaryhistoriansare interestedin the “new”social movementsasboth an indi-
cation andan agent of rapidsocial change. The decisive historical caesuraandpoint of refer-
ence for those historians who aim at the historicisation of social movements are the protests
of 1968 in Western EuropeandtheUSA. Of course, taken on their own, it issometimesdif-
ficult to identify“peace”asaseparateissueamongthelargescalesocial andpolitical upheaval
of these years.3 Second, those scholars who consider themselves to be conducting“historical
peaceresearch”aregenuinelyinterestedin thehistoryof peacemovements. However, thisac-
ademic current has an institutional framework only in the USA and in Germany with, re-
spectively, thePeaceHistorySocietyandtheArbeitskreisHistorische Friedensforschung. These
societiesattempt both to reflect andto extendthe conceptual foundation of their work, with
a normative orientation towards non-violence.4 Third, starting with Neil Smelser’s ‘Theory
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4 SeePeter van den Dungen/LawrenceS. Wittner: PeaceHistory: An Introduction, in: Journal of Peace
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Historical Perspective, in: History Teacher 36 (2003), pp. 297–330; Benjamin Ziemann (ed.): Per-
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of CollectiveBehavior’ in1962, thereisan impressivebodyof sociological literatureonsocial
movements as a characteristic feature of post-war societies which needs to be taken into ac-
count by historians working in this field.5
Although each of these lines of enquiry has produced a substantial body of work, they
could all benefit from more intensive and reflexive cooperation. It is one of the aims of this
volume to argue for such a cooperation and to highlight some of its achievements. Further,
thisvolumeseeksto provide thereader with an up-to-dateaccount of recent historical schol-
arshipon peace movementssince 1945 in four Western European countries, in Japan andin
theUSA, to providesomebasic information on major eventsanddevelopmentsandto guide
the reader to the relevant literature and other resources. All contributions stress peculiarities
and ask very specific questions for future research within a national framework. All of them
also point out general theoretical issues and transnational connections between peace move-
ments in different countries at the level of organisations and common political goals, and in
regardto sharedcultural symbolsandpatternsof protest. Asmanycontributions in thisvol-
ume show, the protests against the US-troops in Vietnam were an important starting point
for the global dissemination of patterns and languages of peace mobilisation. Theyemerged
asmassmovementsin1965 andlasteduntil theregimeinSouthVietnamwasdefeatedbythe
troopsfromcommunist North-Vietnaminthespringof 1975. Theinternational demonstra-
tionsagainst thewar in Vietnamwerenot onlyalaboratoryfor theinvention of practicesand
cultural symbolsof peaceprotest, theywerealso asharedanddistinctiveexperiencefor peace
protesters in manycountries and therefore a decisive watershed in the emergence of a trans-
national peace movement.6
These remarks are not intended to minimise the importance of the global movement for
nuclear disarmament that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, initiallyas a
reaction to the American bombson HiroshimaandNagasaki, which reacheditsheydaydur-
ingtheearly1980s, when several million peoplein NorthAmerica, Asia, AustraliaandWest-
ern Europetookpart in demonstrationsfor anuclear armsfreezeandagainst thedeployment
of US-missiles, and a substantial peace mobilisation even occurred in manycountries of the
Soviet bloc. But it seemsjustifiedto see theVietnammovement asaturningpoint in apeace
movement that transcended national borders, since the transnational contacts between the
national nuclear disarmament movementswerelargelyrestrictedto contactsbetween organi-
sations, at least duringthe first decades. It seems as if a common pattern of cultural symbols
and an awareness of beingpart of a global movement onlydeveloped duringthe 1980s, and
6 BenjaminZiemann
Historyof, in: International Encyclopediaof the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam2001, vol.
16, pp. 11147–11151.
5 Neil J. Smelser: Theory of Collective Behavior, New York 1962; as an exhaustive and very helpful
compilation seeDavidA. Snow/Sarah A. Soule/Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.): TheBlackwell Companion to
Social Movements, Oxford 2004.
6 The best short analysisof the Vietnampeace movement in the US isMelvin Small: Antiwarriors. The
VietnamWar andtheBattle for America’sHeartsandMinds, Wilmington 2002; seethereviewarticle
byCharlesChatfield: At theHandof Historians. TheAntiwar Movement of theVietnamEra, in: Pea-
ce & Change 29 (2004), pp. 483–526.
thismaybe interpretedin part asaheritage of the revolt of 1968. Acrucial factor for the im-
portance of 1968 for the development of transnational social movementsmayhave been the
intensive media coverage of these protests in general and those against the Vietnam war in
particular. Both the war and the protests against it provided ample opportunities for haunt-
ingmedia reports, whereas the risksanddangersof a nuclear war alwaysremainedsomehow
abstract.7
This assessment of the protracted emergence of a transnational peace movement after
1945 partlyresultsfrommyreadingof themagisterial description of theworldnuclear disar-
mament movement byLawrence S. Wittner.8 Wittner’s trilogy, three massive volumes dur-
ing the last decade, is not only an indispensable point of reference for any future study of
peace movements since 1945, it is also an impressive example of world history, bringing to-
gether and masterfully condensing many issues and questions of the three relevant ap-
proaches mentioned above. Yet, although Wittner has written a brillant description of this
particular social movement, his trilogy also has some conceptual and theoretical shortcom-
ings.9
Thefirst major conceptual problemof Wittner’saccount istherather explicit master nar-
rative which provides the framework for his description of the course of events and gives
meaningtoapatternof long-termdevelopmentsbehindthefrequent upsanddownsof peace
mobilization. Thekeytohismasternarrativeisthedistinctionbetween“doves”and“hawks”.
These two termsare nowhere explainedandnot even mentionedin the index, although they
provide most of the analytical agenda of the books. The term “doves” basically refers to the
constituency of the antinuclear movements, whereas “hawks” is the label for the military
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7 From a growing body of literature, compare Hans Günter Hockerts: ‘1968’ als weltweite Bewegung,
in: VenanzSchubert (ed.), 1968: 30 Jahredanach, St. Ottilien 1999, pp. 13–34; Michael A. Schmidt-
ke: „1968“ und die Massenmedien – Momente europäischer Öffentlichkeit, in: Jörg Requate/Martin
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ten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt/M. NewYork 2002, pp. 327–351. About media
coverageof theprotestsin 1968, particularlyin German TV broadcasts, see theongoingwork byMei-
ke Vogel (Bielefeld). Compare also the work by Melvin Small, discussed further below.
8 LawrenceS. Wittner: OneWorldor None. AHistoryof theWorldNuclear Disarmament Movement
Through 1953, Stanford1993; idem: Resistingthe Bomb. AHistoryof the WorldNuclear Disarma-
ment Movement, 1954 1970, Stanford 1997; idem: Toward Nuclear Abolition. A History of the
World Nuclear Disarmament Movement. 1971 to the Present, Stanford: Stanford University Press
2003, 657 pp., £ 25.50. – (paper). For a short synopsis of his argument see idem: The Transnational
Movement against Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1986: APreliminarySurvey, in: Charles Chatfield/Peter
van den Dungen (eds.): Peace Movements and Political Cultures, Knoxville 1988, pp. 265–294;
see the article by Holger Nehring: Die Anti-Atomwaffen-Proteste in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land und in Großbritannien. Zur Entwicklung der Ostermarschbewegung, in: Vorgänge 42 (2003),
pp. 22–31, who stresses divergent national traditions, although British and German antinuclear acti-
vists claimed to be part of an international movement.
9 The reviews in the H-Peace roundtable in May2004 do focus on empirical shortcomings of the three
books: <http://www.h-net.org/~peace> [13.9.2004], but see the more general criticism in the review
byHolgerNehring: <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2004-3-007>[13.9.2004].
brass and important politicians who supported a policy of “peace through strength” and
therefore rejected and opposed most of the efforts for nuclear disarmament. Thus, the mas-
sive upsurge of peace mobilisation in the early 1980s is characterised as the “revolt of the
doves”, and interpreted as a rather natural reaction against an earlier “rise of the hawks”
mainly in the US-administration. This terminology indicates the one differentiation that
makesthestorymorecomplicated: theexistenceof aminorityof “doves”on theother sideof
the rift, particularlysome Democratic congressmen andthe Social Democrats in several Eu-
ropean countries.10
Under thescrutinyof a“secondorder observer”, or, to useanother namefor thesameop-
eration, a deconstruction,11 two majors flawsbecome visible. The first is the empirical ques-
tion: can themajorityof themilitarybrassreallybedescribedas“hawks”without anyrestric-
tions; the world is rarely so black and white. Analysing the different sketches for a peaceful
world, we have to search rather for the multiple shades of greyamong both the militaryand
the peace protesters. The perception of the benefits and dangers of nuclear weapons in the
governments and the military of some major western countries was far more complex and
ambivalent than Wittner isreadyto accept. The other, more seriousproblemis the underly-
ing identification of the “doves” with the “good” cause, which proves that the main distinc-
tion is not an analytical, but rather a moral one. This moral coding of his narrative enables
Wittner to tell the surely “heartening” story of citizens throughout the world who fought
bravelyandcourageouslyagainst the dangers of a nuclear armageddon. This is onlyone fur-
ther example of a “heroic” master narrative which aims to foster identity politics. This is a
common threadin manyworkson thehistoryof pacifism, but it isan insufficient framework
to deal with the complexityof past peace movements.12 Thedangersof the nuclear armsrace
observedbythe “doves” were inherent andinevitable risksof political decision-makingfrom
the viewpoint of the “hawks”: the same, a political decision, is different, and the different is
the same. For this reason Wittner’s keydistinction lacks the analytical power to analyse one
of the central paradoxes of peace mobilisation.13
Another problemthat isparticularlypresent in thethirdvolumeisWittner’sconceptuali-
sation of public support for the movement. He makesample use of opinion polls to demon-
8 BenjaminZiemann
10 See Wittner: Toward Nuclear Abolition, chapters 6–11.
11 Niklas Luhmann: Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing, in: NewLiterary History 24 (1993),
pp. 763-782.
12 See the critique in: Jeffrey Verhey: Die Geschichtsschreibung des Pazifismus und die Friedensbewe-
gung, in: Ziemann, Perspektiven, pp. 272–285. Quote: Wittner: Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 487.
Jeremi Suri triedto counter Wittner with adenunciation of the“pathological elements”of antinuclear
acitivism. For obvious reasons, this moralistic allegation failed to break up the moral coding of Witt-
ner’s argument and was easily dismissed by him. See the debate in <http://www.h-net.org/~peace>
[13.9.2004].
13 See the contribution by Thorsten Bonacker and Lars Schmitt in this volume. “Danger” is the term
used throughout by Wittner, see for example idem: Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 483. In general,
compareNiklasLuhmann: Risk. ASociological Theory, Berlin. NewYork 1993; for an English intro-
duction into sociological systems theory see William Rasch: Niklas Luhmanns Modernity. The Para-
doxes of Differentiation, Stanford 2000.
stratethewidespreadsupport for themovement, but hetendstomistaketheresultsof polling
for public opinion. This is a problematic tendency in itself, at least in the light of recent re-
search that shows that opinion polling not only reflects, it also constructs public opinion.14
But the more seriousproblem is that Witner cites the resultsof opinion polls in a superficial
manner, to substantiate the perception of a public climate in favour of arms control and re-
duction. Onlyveryrarelyistheexact wordingof thequestionsin thepollsgiven, andWittner
frequently assumes a popular mood in favour of nuclear disarmament is an indication of a
public opinion supportiveof themovement anditsgoals.15 But asMelvin Small hasput it in
a comparable context: “(..) to say that the polls reflected increasing dissatisfaction with ad-
ministration policyandto attributethat dissatisfaction to theantiwar movement aretwo dif-
ferent things.”16 Asophisticateduseof pollsassourcesfor public opinion on disarmament is-
sueswouldpoint out thecontradictionsin thedata, andwouldtrytoexplain theoften appar-
ent discrepancybetween overwhelmingsupport for armsreduction and“peaceful”solutions
in general and the rather limited support for particular peace movement proposals.17 Akey
issue seemsto be the question of unilateral disarmament. In 1983, 77 percent of a sample of
Greekspolledon theEuromissilesopposedthedeployment of cruiseandPershingII missiles
“even if the Soviet Union failed to withdrawits SS-20s”.18 This is an impressive figure, but
one can doubt whether pollsters would have found a similar figure in any other European
country at this time. A sample of people in West Germany polled by the Institut für
Demoskopie in July 1981 opposed the idea of unilateral disarmament with a majority of 47
percent. Only33 percent of the sample approved unilateral disarmament in general, and 20
percent wereundetermined. Thisstateof public opinion in theFederal Republic wasonlyre-
versed during the second half of the 1980s, after Mikhail Gorbachev had come into power
and had demonstrated his readiness to initiate unilateral arms reductions.19
Amore general problem of Wittner’snarrative stemsfrom his“realistic” approach to the
relationshipbetween the systemof international relationsandthe emergence of peace move-
ments. Accordingto thisargument, thedisarmament movement andthe“nuclear armsrace”
developed“simultaneous[ly]”after thelate1970s, becausetheformer wasa“direct response”
to the latter andthe “heighteningnuclear danger”. In this rather mechanistic andsomewhat
teleological reasoning, the peace movement had to intensify in the early 1980s, because it
“was not yet sufficient to halt the unravelling” of the détente of the 1970s. And the historic
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nion Research, in: British Journal of Sociology50 (1999), pp. 367–396.
15 See Wittner: Toward Nuclear Abolition, esp. pp. 149, 177, 197, 338.
16 Melvin Small: TheImpact of theAntiwar Movement on Lyndon B. Johnson 1965–1968, in: Peace&
Change 10 (1984), pp. 1–22, p. 2.
17 For abrillant attempt in thisdirection seeMichael Geyer: ColdWar Angst. TheCaseof West German
Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons, in: Hanna Schissler (ed.): The Miracle Years.
A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968, Princeton 2001, pp. 376–408.
18 Wittner: TowardNuclear Abolition, p. 163. The support for unilateral nuclear disarmament in Great
Britain never went higher than 31%: idem: Transnational Movement, p. 278.
19 Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, vol. 9 (1984–1992), Munich 1993, p. 1063.
missionof theonceagainstrengthenedmovement, whichwassuccessfullyaccomplished, was
to prevent a “nuclear war”.20 There is, of course, nothing to back up this kind of
counterfactual reasoning. Wittner can not produce a single piece of evidence to substantiate
hisassumptionthat theworldwasonthebrinkof nuclearannihilation, becausealeadingpol-
itician or general wasgoingto decideto usethebomb. Even moreproblematic isthefact that
Wittner ignores a growing body of literature which focuses on protest as something created
by protesters rather than as a necessary reaction to a latent political crisis.21
The basic argument of this approach can be summarised as: protest movements emerge
when a conflict is generated byprotest communication, and because of this communication
the movements are able to connect with specific audiences, to build on certain individual
motivesandcommitmentsandtoinstitutionalisethemselves. It isnot apolitical crisislikethe
arms race that produces protest communication, but rather the perception of this crisis that
providesastartingpoint for protests. Built aroundaconstructivist theoretical design, thisap-
proach is particularly interested in the framing of protest communication that addresses
causesandresponsibilitieswhich pose a threat to worldpeace. These framesalso provide the
protest communication with collective patterns of interpretation, which make it possible to
findresonancefor thegoalsof protest in specific audiences.22 Agoodrecent exampleistheis-
sue of anti-Americanismin West German public opinion duringthe 1980s. The widespread
public rejection of the deployment of middle-range missiles on German soil owed a lot to a
communicative frame that focused on the US as an enemyrather than as an ally. These per-
ceptions, which were partly based on a genuine feeling of German patriotism, but also re-
flected the projection of more general cultural and political problems on the superpower
USA, had their symbolic centre piece in the “troika” of Reagan-Haig-Weinberger and were
groundedin ahighlygendereddiscourse on the “male”power crazinessof US foreign policy
makers.23 Another consequence of this theoretical agenda is to stress the volatile and highly
fragmented collective identity of protest movements. Protest movements have to be con-
stantlyreproducedthrough the use of symbols, ritualsandother formsof performative com-
munication.24 Although most of the rank and file of the nuclear disarmament movements
camefromthe“universityeducatedmiddle-class”, theirsharedsocial backgroundhadtofind
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20 Wittner: Toward Nuclear Abolition, quotes pp. 90, 485.
21 For the following, see the article by Thorsten Bonacker and Lars Schmitt in this volume.
22 SeeJürgen Gerhards/Dieter Rucht: Mesomobilization. OrganizingandFramingin Two Protest Cam-
paigns in West Germany, in: American Journal of Sociology 98 (1992), pp. 555–596.
23 See the articles by Belinda Davis and Wilfried Mausbach in this volume; Max Paul Friedman: Cold
War Critiques from Abroad: Beyond a Taxonomy of Anti-Americanism, in: Bulletin of the German
Historical Institute Washington 34 (2004), pp. 113–126. Wittner: Toward Nuclear Abolition,
pp. 149, 238, fails to identifythis mood as a source for public mistrust in US defense policyand only
brieflymentionsanti-Americanismasamajorobstaclefortransatlantic peacemovement cooperation.
24 See Belinda Davis: Provokation als Emanzipation. 1968 und die Emotionen, in: Vorgänge 164
(2003), pp. 41–49. Manydetailedandimpressivedescriptionsof performativeactscan befoundin the
important study by Michael S. Foley: Confronting the War Machine. Draft Resistance during the
Vietnam War, Chapel Hill. London 2003; see also the stimulating reflections in Joel P. Rhodes: The
Voice of Violence. Performative Violence as Protest in the Vietnam Era, Westport/Conn. 2001.
expression on asymbolic level.25 Thegendereddiscoursesof peaceprotest fosteredandlegiti-
matedtheprotest movement’spublic appeal, but sometimestheyalso tendedto obstruct the
construction of a collective peace movement identity.26
Peace movements as a form of protest communication should be able to sustain them-
selvesas longas theyhave a background, a social environment which can be usedasa reason
to protest. When we followthis approach, two crucial questions emerge. The first one deals
with a problem that was also a subject for reflections on the “resources” of “peace organisa-
tions”within theframeworkof theresourcemobilisation theory. Theseresourcescan beseen
as the “funds”, the “organisational structures” and the “constituencies” of peace move-
ments.27 From the perspective of communications theory, we should not reduce protest
movements to their organisations, despite the fact that organisations provide social move-
mentswith stable addresses that allowone to communicate with them even if there isno ac-
tual protest happening. Generallyspeaking, protest communicationonlymarginallyrelieson
theformation of clearlydefinedmembershiproles, whichisan important featureof organisa-
tions. Rather, it employspersonal commitmentsandmotives. Akeyto thisformof mobilisa-
tion iscommunication in amoral language, onethat tendsto disparagethosewho are identi-
fiedasculpritsandthat cherishespositivevalueslikecivil disobedienceorpeaceandindividu-
als who can be connected to these values.28 One vivid example is the folk singer Joan Baez,
who had a number of high-profile appearances as a leading figure of the Vietnam antiwar
movement after 1964.29 Recently interviewed about the defining moment that inspired her
to developher political conscience, her belief in non-violent peace action, she remembereda
visit to Baghdadat the age of ten with her father, duringwhich she read‘The Diaryof Anne
Frank’.30
Anothercrucial issueforprotests, asforanyotherformof communication, istheproblem
of understanding. Everycommunicativeoperation onlycomesto an endif “alter”, therecipi-
ent of an utteranceby“ego”, isableto understandtheutterance, i.e., to differentiatebetween
the enunciation and the information of the message and to reconcile this information with
his own expectations. Seen from this perspective, communication is not the transfer of a
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Gender Roles and Nuclear Disarmament Activism, 1954–1965, in: Gender & History 12 (2000),
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wiston 1995, pp. 33–54, pp. 35–38.
28 SeethecontributionbyThorstenBonackerandLarsSchmitt in thisvolume; seealsoWolfgangKrohn:
Funktionen der Moralkommunikation, in: Soziale Systeme 5 (1999), pp. 313–338.
29 See Small: Antiwarriors, pp. 13, 28, 154.
30 See the interviewby Nigel Williamson in The Guardian, 27.8.2003, G 2, pp. 12–13; compare Wil-
fried Mausbach: Auschwitz and Vietnam. West German Protest Against America’s War During the
1960s, in: AndreasW. Daum/LloydC. Gardner/WilfriedMausbach (eds.): America, theVietnamWar,
andtheWorld: ComparativeandInternational Perspectives, Cambridge2003, pp. 279–298, p. 281..
piece of information, but rather an operation that is able to result in a shared horizon of ex-
pectations. Workinglike this, communication doesnot dependon transmission in a techni-
cal sense, but rather on connectivity. Hence, the decisive question is: with whom should
peace movementsseek to connect with their protest communication?The conventional wis-
domsaysthepolitical elite, because themain goal isto influencetheprocessof political deci-
sion-making, andthisis, of course, themain perspectiveof Wittner’strilogy. But beforepro-
testscan addressandinfluence politicians, theyhave to reach out to abroadspectre of possi-
ble sympathisers, who might be willingto join in ahuge peace rallyor to sign apetition. Ac-
cordingto thesociologist NiklasLuhmann, who hasdevelopedsomeof thebasic conceptsof
communicationstheory, thisformof connectivityfollowsadistinction between acentreand
aperipheryof protest communication.31 However, thereseemstobeastrongportionof idea-
lisation in the assumption that protest movements are the self-evident mouthpiece of the
concerns and requests of a silent majorityof the population. This situation is due to the fact
that not onlytheusual parametersof social statuslikeincome, reputationorhighereducation
diplomas are unequally distributed among the population, so, too, are the possibilities of
voicinggeneral demands in the public. Even if the speaker of a peace movement was in har-
mony with the fear of war in a working-class audience, he still might not have been able to
connect becausehismiddle-classhabitsseparatedhimfromhisaudience, which coulddiffer-
entiatebetween theenunciation andtheinformation of hisspeech.32 Perhapsmuchmoreof-
tenthanweassumeit wasnot onlythe“distant natureof foreignpolicyissues”that hampered
peacemobilisation, but also thedistancebetween thekeyprotestersandthepeopletheytried
to connect with.33
Acomprehensive account such asLawrence Wittner’s trilogyon the global nuclear disar-
mament movement since 1945 has to work hard to condense the complexity of historical
change, andthushasto omit a lot of seeminglyindispensable topicsanddeliberations. With
regardto the historyof peace movementsin countries like Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan andtheUSA, whicharecoveredin thisvolume, all of thesehistoriesareembeddedin the
particular context of that nation-state and society. As some contributions to this volume
stress, it isfruitful toseepeacemovementsratherasagatewaytopeculiarsocial developments
than asaseparate issue, oneremotefromthegeneral trendsof national history. Oneexample
is the history of peace movements in the United Kingdom, where the perspective of social
movement theorymight allowone to challenge the still dominant self description of British
societyasaclasssociety. On the other hand, we findexamples like the USA, where peace ac-
tivismhasbeen distinct fromthe centre of the national politic fabric for a longtime, andhas
only lately managed to move from the margins to the mainstream of political culture.34
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Companion, pp. 641–665, p. 659.
34 See especially the articles by Holger Nehring, Volker Fuhrt and Natalie Atkin in this volume.
Among the national case studies dealt with in this volume, France and Italy seem to fol-
lowa similar pattern, one that is significantly different from that of all other western Euro-
pean nations and the US. In both countries, the two most important peace movement or-
ganisations were closely aligned, respectively, to the Communist Party and the Catholic
Church, whereas Communist peace activities in the US and in the Federal Republic of Ger-
manywere hotlyembattledandreceivedsevere blowsfrom the anticommunist frenzyof the
1950s.35 This parallel development of two highlycentralised peace movements with a set of
stable normative orientations in France and Italy needs further investigation, although the
gradual demise and final collapse of Communism in 1989 has turned at least one of them
into a historical subject. For Catholic peace activism, it seems again as if the protest move-
ments of 1968 moved the activism decisively in the direction of an increasing transnational
flowandinterconnection of intellectual ideasandconceptionsfor a“just”andpeaceful social
order. This had global repercussions not only among Catholics but also among Protestant
movement activists. Thepivotal point wastheemergenceof liberation theologyin Brazil and
other Latin American countriesafter themid-1960s, whichprovidedalanguageandsymbol-
ism of morality and humanistic dedication that fuelled peace activists in many European
countries. This issue has not yet been substantially researched in depth due to the gap be-
tween church history, located in theological departments, and general historythat is charac-
teristic forthehistorical disciplineinmanycountries. Eventhenit isperhapsnot anexaggera-
tion to saythat liberation theologywas—on a global scale—the most powerful political ide-
ology on the left during the 1970s and 1980s.36
All further readings of the articles in this volume will be left to the individual reader. I
would like here to raise five general points that should be more intensively researched and
more thoroughly conceptualised in future studies on peace movements in the period after
1945. Acouple of them do focus on the role of symbols and symbolic performances for the
public visibility of peace movements, which is basically a consequence of the constructivist
approach outlinedabove. If peace movementsare not a“natural”reaction to an ever-present
danger, but rather a communicative effort to observe risks as dangers, then we have to focus
on the symbolic actions that allow to gain public legitimacy for this claim.
Myfirst point concerns the historical connections between the man-made mass death of
the Second World War, that reached a climax in the genocide against European Jewrycom-
mitted by Nazi Germany and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that unbound Pro-
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metheus in a waythat was probablybeyond the imagination of most of the people who had
encouraged and promoted progress in industrial warfare during the 19th century. In an im-
portant collection of articles, Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann have recently pointed to
the apparent paradox that there wasan upsurge of cultural expressionsfor violence andmass
death in the aftermath of the First World War, whereas the second postwar transition from
1945 to the 1950s seems best to be characterised by “silence” about the mass murders from
1939 to 1945 and by“a rush to (re)establish normality”. The burgeoning consumer culture
of the 1950s and the restorative ecclesiastical triumphalism of the Catholic Church in Ger-
manyafter 1945 reveal theintensitywith which manypeopletriedto escapefromtheviolent
ruptures of the 1940s.37 There is, of course, the example of Japan, where the two atomic
bombings triggered a national consensus in favour of demilitarisation and rejection of any
militaryengagement. Thisconsensus, which formedthe backgroundfor the development of
Japanese peace movements, was embedded in a national cult of victimisation which meant
that one’s own atrocities committed in Korea and other occupied countries during the Sec-
ond World War were not remembered.38 It is likely that a more sensitive reading of the se-
manticsof peace movements in Western Europe andthe USAin the decadesafter 1945 will
also reveal frequent referencesto destruction, massdeath andsystematic annihilation during
the SecondWorldWar. These more or lesshidden connectionsbetween the violence of war
before and peace protest after 1945 need to be further investigated.39 For later decades, it is
already obvious howpertinent the invocation of mass death during the 1940s seemed to be
for manypeaceactivists. TheAustralian pediatrician Helen Caldicott, born 1938 andalead-
ingmember of the nuclear disarmament movement since the late 1960s, frequentlyreferred
to her fear of a “nuclear holocaust” as a main motivation for her commitment.40
Another topic that has been largelyneglected so far is the role of experts as iconic figures
for peace movement mobilisation. Traditionally, pacifist organisations had their movement
intellectuals, who couldwork asspeakersat massdemonstrationsandelsewhere to foster the
reputation andlegitimacyof themovement. Thealmost nonagenarian philosopher Bertrand
Russell in Great Britain and the theologian Albert Schweitzer in the Federal Republic, who
during the late 1950s and early 1960s were symbolic rallying points for antinuclear protest,
are well known examples of this kind of intellectual support. Their public authority origi-
nated mostlyfrom their widelyassumed moral integrity, their general respectabilityas intel-
lectualsand, last but not least, their age, which denotedalifetime of experience. Thisauraof
aspecific typeof intellectualsremainedstableduringmost of the1950sand1960. It is inter-
estingto note that theWest German Chancellor KonradAdenauer easilydismissedthespec-
tacular “Göttingen appeal”of 18 prominent German atomic physicistsagainst nuclear arma-
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ment of theBundeswehr in 1957 asillusionaryandunrealistic, andat thesametimeprivately
expressedhisdeepconcernsabout apublic appeal byAlbert Schweitzer, whowasawardedthe
Nobel Peace Prize that year.41
Startingperhapsin the late 1960s, anewtype of intellectual knowledge came to the fore-
front of peace protest, and their testimonies assisted the legitimacy of pacifist mobilisation.
Theseexpertswereacademicswho hadaprofessional relationshipto peaceanddisarmament
issues, either asphysicians, who couldpoint out themedical dangersof aconventional or nu-
clearwar, as(atomic) physicists, whocouldclaimtobeexpertson nuclear fission andweapon
systems, or aspeaceresearchers, who taught thepublic about thepossibilitiesof conflict reso-
lution. Future research should followthe rise of these newtypes of peace experts, which was
relatedto thedevelopment of aknowledgesociety, andscrutinise theconstativeaswell asthe
performative function of their public assertions.42
Another largelyneglectedaspect of thesymbolic performanceof peacemovementsistheir
use of pictures and pictorial symbols. One aspect of this topic are the emblems of peace
movements, for example the white dove on a blue background, the proverbial “peace sign”
that was developed for the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, or the logo of the
Nevada-Semipalatinsk test sites movement that showed “a native Kazakh sharing a peace
pipe with aNative American”.43 These logosare part of the peace protesters’ attemptsto de-
velopaframeworkforcollectiveidentityandcollectiveaction. But theimportanceof pictures
for peace mobilisation goes beyond the search for popular icons that can be used as buttons,
stickers, etc. Every protest communication needs to develop a visionary imagination of a
kingdom-come, of aworldthat transcendsthevicesandthemoral corruption of thecontem-
porary, functional, differentiatedsocietyandisable to offer aprospect for harmony, integra-
tion andthe abolition of alienation. This issue iswell known asapart of the antisemitic pro-
test communication of the Nazi movement during the Weimar Republic, which had both a
vivid imagination of the moral corruption and degeneration of the Jewish “race” and a
broadlydevelopedpictorial language that envisioneda utopia of racial purity, violent regen-
eration of thebodypolitic andthecommunityspirit andwassubstantiatedin paintings, pho-
tographs, posters and monuments.44 Set against this evidence, we can recognise the lack of
empirical research about the pictorial visions of post-war peace protests. Which symbols,
subjects and artistic techniques enabled peace movements to visualise and aestheticise an
imagination of a peaceful world, and which models of social order were envisioned in these
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pictures?45 Thereisan abundanceof antiwar-picturesin thevisual art of the20th century, but
it ishardto discover manyexamplesof pacifist paintingsor posterswithasubstantial positive
vision for peace.46
But thecreation of picturesfor peacemobilisation wasnot onlyataskfor artistsandillus-
trators. Protest communication always relies on the performative power of human bodies as
well, andisinventive in theuseof bodiesassignifiersfor manifest conflict. Theclassic exam-
ple, of course, is the mass demonstration, an assembly of people marching down the street,
wavingbannersandvoicingtheir concerns in chantsandsongs.47 But there have been many
other formsandexamplesof protest that usedbodiesassymbols, andthere isatendencythat
the agglomeration of a large number of human beingsdidnot alwayssucceedin drawingthe
attention of wider public to the protesters. Many bodily protest performances came near to
thetradition of tableauxvivanteandweresuccessful andspectacular witharather small num-
ber of active participants. Some of the most impressive examples happened duringthe Viet-
namantiwar movement in theUSA, whichworkedasalaboratoryfor theinvention andtest-
ing of significant and signifying bodily protest happenings.
Duringtheearlystagesof themovement, somecasesof self-immolationoccurred, includ-
ingone byAlice Herz, a82-year oldpeace activist andrefugee fromNazi Germany, andone
bythe 32-year oldQuaker Norman R. Morrison, who burnedhimself in front of the Penta-
gon on November 2, 1965. Afinal climax in the use of human bodies for protest against the
Vietnam war was the demonstration of 600 members of VVAW (Vietnam Veterans against
theWar) in front of theCapitol on April 23, 1971. Theythrewtheircombat medalsonto the
Capitol lawn, and many of them appeared “in wheelchairs, on crutches or with missing
limbs”, their bodiesgivingevidenceabout thedestructivepowersof wartimeviolenceandle-
gitimising their rationale for protest at the same time.48 Particularly the latter case is, seen
fromaconceptual angle, revealingfor the importance of bodiesassignifiersof protest. More
than anyformof intellectual or moralistic reasoning, the mutilation of their own bodieswas
an argument for and witness of the personal commitment of these soldiers. As a spectacular
event, this gatheringwas also important for the movement because it received a tremendous
and largely positive media coverage, although only a small number of participants was in-
volved. Bob Haldeman, the White House chief of staff and Nixon’s key adviser, was frus-
trated by the sympathetic coverage of this happening and lamented that the media had “by
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their own obession created a major thing out of what should have been almost totally ig-
nored”.49
Although it is easy to understand Haldeman´s anger, he missed the importance of mass
mediaforprotest communication, andviceversa. Themediaarecrucial forpeacemovements
because they create public attention for their concerns and help them gain influence on the
thematic agendaof the political system. Over the last decades, astructural couplingbetween
the media and social movements has emerged that has led, on the part of the latter, to the
careful staging of “pseudo events” which are designed purely to get media coverage. The
Greenpeace campaignssince the bombingof their flagship RainbowWarrior in the harbour
of Auckland in 1985 are ample evidence of this tendency.50 The media, for its part, is inter-
ested in “news”, which means information that makes a difference. As long as social move-
mentscan provideincentivesto report about conflicts, themassmediaisableto operatewith
its code information/non-information and will showan inclination to cover protest events,
notwithstandingwhether theydo so with apositiveor anegativebias.51 Thismodeof opera-
tion exertsastrongpressure on protest communication, because after awhile even “the larg-
est crowd in American history” is no longer “news” for the journalists, who might have re-
ported about the “largest crowd in…” at several earlier instances.52 These are at least some
conceptual suggestions for historical work on the relation between protest movements and
the mass media. Unfortunately, with the exception of the pioneering work done by Melvin
Small, there has been little substantial work in this area so far.
The same assertion is true for the fifth andlast desideratum I would like to raise. It helps
us to understand the ambivalence of protest communication, and opens up the much de-
batedandstill not veryclearlydefinedissue of the “achievements”of peace movements.53 At
stake is the interaction between peace protest and the decision-making of the military and
political elite. This is, of course, a major topic in Lawrence Wittner’s description of the nu-
clear disarmament movement. Wittner lavishly praises the sweeping success of the move-
ment inthe1980s, claimingtheyforcedthetwosuperpowersintotheINF treatyof 1987 and
intosomeothermeasuresthat curbedthenucleararmsrace. Perhapsduetothelackof declas-
sified documents for the 1980s, onlyrarelyis there detailed evidence for the specific mecha-
nismsanddirect linksbetween pressurefrom“below”andretreat from“above”.54 Theinter-
action between protest andpower isthetopic of theveryambitiousbookbyJeremi Suri. Suri
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interprets the emergence of détente in the 1970s as a reaction to the global protest move-
mentsof 1968. Suri givesaparallel andbrilliantlyconceivedaccount of domestic andforeign
policydevelopmentsin no lessthan sixcountries—Britain, France, Germany, Chinaandthe
two superpowers—andisableto catch theheatedatmosphereandthelanguagesof dissent in
cities as different as Paris, Berkeley, Berlin, Moscowand Prague. Particularly instructive are
hisremarksabout the often overlookedstructural reasonsfor the explosion of student unrest
in the latesixties, which wererelatedto the largescaleexpansion of higher education in most
countries in the west andin the east. He rightlyrelates the upheaval at the universities to the
crowded campus dormitories and to the lack of personal freedom.55
Nonetheless, Suri fallsshort when it comesto producingdetailedevidenceof theconnec-
tionbetweenstudent unrest andthedecision-makingwhichledtoapolicyof détente. Oneof
the rare examples is the 1966 reflectionsbyEgon Bahr, the mastermindof the Social Demo-
craticOstpolitik andlater theforeign policyadviser toChancellorWillyBrandt, about theex-
istence of a “newgeneration” that led to “rising extremism on the right” and “on the left”.
Even then, this “spread of radicalism” perhaps more “accompanied” than actually triggered
or influenced the efforts byBahr and Brandt to open newdiplomatic channels to the Soviet
government andto facilitatetheacceptanceof thestatusquo in relationsbetween theFederal
Republic andPoland, theGDR andtheSoviet Union.56 Forunknown reasons, Suri doesnot
rely on the detailed and careful research Melvin Small has presented on the influence of the
antiwar movement on the decision-makingprocessesof the Johnson andNixon administra-
tions.57 What is still missing, then, is a thorough long-term analysis of the perceptions and
images of the peace protests amongthe militarybrass and the diplomatic elite. This analysis
must pay attention to patterns of cultural distance and misunderstanding and to points of
empathy. Such an endeavour could also contribute to future research on the “costs” of the
ColdWar, whichGustavSchmidt recentlyincludedin hisagendafor futureresearch.58 Asto
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the part of protesters in their interaction withRealpolitik, it is misleading to blame them for
not “workingto change institutions from within”.59 Protest communication isnot designed
to function asapart of theopposition within thepolitical system, an opposition preparingit-
self to cometo power oneday, an opposition discipliningitself for thisentryinto political re-
sponsibility. Protest can allowitself to be reckless andimprudent, because this attitude is es-
sential for thisformof communication, whichtendstoobject withinsocietyagainst society.
Many more questions and conceptual issues for future research in the history of peace
movementssince 1945 couldbe raised, but thiswouldgo beyondthe scope of this introduc-
tion.60 Thisfieldof enquiryis, asoutlinedabove, still not veryintensivelydevelopedandisin
constant flux. Althoughmajorachievementshavealreadybeenmade, everysinglefuturecon-
tribution will raise the complexity of this subject, a subject that is still under construction.
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